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ABSTRACT
The role of social media in promoting media pluralism was initially
viewed as wholly positive as social media could break the oligopoly
of (often state-owned) mainstream media. However, some govern-
ments are allegedly manipulating social media by hiring online
commentators (also known as trolls) to spread propaganda and dis-
information. In particular, an alleged system of professional trolls
operating both domestically and internationally exists in Russia.
To improve transparency on trolls’ influence on social media,
Twitter released in 2018 longitudinal data on accounts identified
as Russian trolls and their tweets, starting a wave of quantitative
research on Russian trolls. However, while foreign-targeted English
language operations of these trolls have received significant atten-
tion, no research has analyzed their Russian language domestic and
regional-targeted activities. This is despite the fact that half of the
tweets in the Twitter-released data are in Russian. We address this
gap by characterizing the Russian-language operations of Russian
trolls using the Twitter data. We first take a broad view with a
descriptive and temporal analysis, and then focus in on the trolls’
operation related to the crash of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, one
of the deadliest incidents in the conflict in Ukraine.
Among other things, we find that Russian-language trolls have
run 163 hashtag campaigns (where the use of a hashtag grows
abruptly within one month). The main political sentiments of such
campaigns are praising Russia and Putin (29%), criticizing Ukraine
(26%), and criticizing the United States (US) along with Obama
(9%). Further, we discovered that trolls actively reshared informa-
tion. Namely, 76% of tweets were retweets or contained a URL.
Particularly often trolls distributed the news of mainstream media.
Additionally, we observe periodic temporal patterns of tweet ar-
rival, with three distinct periods that change over time, suggesting
that trolls use automation tools for posting. Further, we find that
trolls’ information campaign on the MH17 crash was the largest in
terms of tweet count. However, around 68% of tweets posted with
MH17 hashtags were likely used simply for hashtag amplification.
With these tweets excluded, about 49% of the tweets suggested to
varying levels that Ukraine was responsible for the crash, and only
13% contained disinformation and propaganda presented as news.
Interestingly, trolls promoted inconsistent alternative theories for
the incident. Namely, half of the false news tweets suggested that
Ukraine downed the plane with an air-to-air missile, whereas 23%
promoted the ground-to-air missile version.
∗Corresponding author
1 INTRODUCTION
The advent of social media marked a significant change in me-
dia production and distribution, which was previously monopo-
lized by large, often state-owned institutions [22]. Social media
enables users to share their own opinions and present alternative
viewpoints, thereby changing users’ roles from passive content
consumers to prosumers (producers and consumers). Social media
helps build online communities, encourages debate, and mobilizes
users, and therefore can promote democracy [27].
However, despite the initial enthusiasm about the democracy-
promoting role of social media, such media can be manipulated
by various parties [2]. For example, non-democratic governments
allegedly hire online commentators to spread speculation, propa-
ganda, and disinformation so as to push agendas and manipulate
public opinion [28, 35]. Such paid commentators are referred to as
trolls [21, 23].
An alleged system of professional paid trolls exists in Russia co-
ordinated by a company called Internet Research Agency (IRA) [25],
which is also referred to as a troll factory (e.g., [9]). The Russian
trolls are alleged to have interfered with several international polit-
ical and social events, most prominently the 2016 US presidential
election [25]. Such claims have triggered a new research stream on
the operations and impact of paid Internet trolls, particularly those
associated with IRA (e.g., [14, 15, 35]). However, such studies are
still scarce [30]. Furthermore, while foreign-targeted operations of
Russian trolls have received some attention, as far as we know, no
studies have analyzed their domestic and regional-targeted activi-
ties.
To address this gap, this paper analyzes the domestic and regional
operations of Russian trolls by studying their Russian-language
Twitter posts (tweets) from a dataset recently released by Twitter
[31]. Although the procedure of troll detection adopted by Twit-
ter remains unclear, we assume that the identified troll accounts
indeed belonged to paid and centrally coordinated commentators.
This study is the first to characterize the domestic and regional
operations of Russian trolls based on the data provided by Twitter.
We discover that the crash of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 has
prompted the largest information campaign of Russian-language
trolls. Therefore, the paper further focuses on the trolls’ reaction to
the crash of MH17.
Overall, the issue of state-sponsored organized trolls remains
important with novel disinformation campaigns even targeting the
COVID-19 pandemic [10].
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the data
analyzed. Section 3 presents the related work. Section 4 analyzes
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hashtags, retweets, and URLs that Russian trolls’ used in their do-
mestic and regional operations. Section 5 studies temporal posting
patterns of troll tweets. Section 6 focuses on the MH17-related ac-
tivities of trolls. Finally, results are discussed and conclusions are
drawn in Section 7.
2 DATA
In 2017, due to the investigation into Russian involvement in the
2016 U.S. elections and to increase transparency into foreign influ-
ence on its platform, Twitter released a list of accounts believed
to be associated with the IRA. The troll tweets posted from these
accounts were then first collected and released by researchers from
Clemson University1 and later by Twitter itself [31].
Specifically, between October 2018 and September 2019 Twitter
released 9,691,682 tweets published between May 2009 and Novem-
ber 2018 by 3843 troll accounts related to the IRA [31]. The dataset
includes all public, non-deleted tweets from such accounts.
The dataset contains the following information:
• Tweet: ID, language, text, time, and name of client applica-
tion used to post the tweet. And when applicable ID of the
tweet and user that the current tweet replied to, reposted
(retweeted), quoted, or mentioned, number of times the cur-
rent tweet was quoted, replied to, liked, and retweeted2, list
of hashtags, URLs, and tweet geolocation.
• User/Profile: ID, anonymized display and screen names,
self-reported location, description of profile, language, cre-
ation date, number of followers and followed accounts at the
time of suspension.
The language of 50.15% (around 4.86M) of the troll tweets is
Russian. We focus on and perform analyses on these Russian lan-
guage tweets and trolls (though we also perform some comparisons
against the English language trolls and tweets). These tweets were
posted by 1551 accounts between January 2010 and September 2018,
with 97% of these tweets falling between 2014 and 2017. The num-
ber of trolls with at least one tweet in a month exceeded 1000 from
September 2014 to October 2015 and reached the maximum of 1115
in April 2015. At the same time, the number of tweets posted during
these months varied considerably from 74K to 413K. For reference,
Figure 1 details the number of tweets and trolls per month over time.
Further, we only analyze tweets posted in 2014-2017 to concentrate
on the period of trolls’ highest activity.
3 RELATEDWORK
3.1 Quantitative studies of Russian trolls
The data on troll accounts and tweets released by Twitter has started
a wave of quantitative research on Russian trolls. Table 1 provides
an overview of such studies.
Quantitative troll studies can be divided into those (1) focusing
on describing the behavior, strategy, and operations of trolls; (2) as-
sessing the impact of trolls’ operations; and (3) proposing methods
for troll detection. The first group of studies are mostly descriptive
1https://github.com/fivethirtyeight/russian-troll-tweets
2The count of likes and retweets exclude the engagements from users who are sus-
pended or deleted at the moment of data release (e.g., trolls)
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Figure 1: Number of troll tweets (solid blue) and trolls
(dashed red) over time
and exploratory, characterizing the operations of trolls along multi-
ple dimensions, including the use of hashtags, URLs, and retweets
(e.g., [14, 34, 35]). The second group of studies typically assesses the
impact of trolls’ operations by tracking the engagement with trolls
within the social network and in the greater Web [3, 28, 34, 35]. The
third group of studies often uses linguistic features (such as features
common to native Russian speakers in English-language conver-
sations) to detect trolls [5, 11], although some studies (e.g., [16])
use a broader set of features for troll detection, including profile-,
behavior-, and stop word usage-related features. Quantitative troll
studies could further be divided into those taking a broad scope,
and those focusing on a particular propaganda campaign, most
often the 2016 US Elections [1, 3, 5, 15, 17, 20] and Brexit [14, 21].
This paper belongs to the first group of studies taking first a broad
scope, after which focusing on the MH17 campaign.
Quantitative troll studies have typically analyzed textual data
from Twitter (Table 1). However, a few studies also examined Face-
book ads purchased by IRA [5], images posted on Twitter [33], as
well as posts on other social networks, such as Reddit [35] and the
blogging platform LiveJournal [28] (popular in Russia). Further-
more, the first multi-platform troll studies have started to appear
[15].
Previous research suggests that the behavior of IRA trolls signif-
icantly differs from ordinary social media users in posting patterns
and language use. Namely, on Twitter, trolls often exhibit abnormal
tweet and retweet rates, use more hashtags, and share more URLs
[1, 16]. Moreover, they post shorter tweets with shorter words,
use fewer words that indicate causation, and use less emojis [1, 5].
Furthermore, the trolls differ from each other. For example, [20]
identified five groups of trolls based on their behavior: right troll,
left troll, news feed, hashtag gamer, and fearmonger. Finally, [17]
observed that the strategic behavior of trolls changes over time.
Among the studies of Russian trolls, our work most closely re-
lates to [34, 35] in taking an exploratory approach and character-
izing the activity of trolls across various dimensions. However,
unlike [34, 35], which analyze the content of English-language troll
tweets and other troll activity (e.g., URL sharing) without language
separation, we focus on Russian-language troll operations.
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Table 1: Quantitative studies of the activity of organized trolls on social media
Ref Data Research objectives Scope (case)
[1] 1.2M tweets by 1148 troll accounts;
12.4M tweets by 1.2M ordinary users
Detect: Identify linguistic markers of deception in trolls’
posts and test their applicability for troll detection
US Elections; Broad, ex-
ploratory
[3] 540K “original” tweets by 1148 troll ac-
counts; 13.6M tweets of ordinary users
Assess the impact: Understand what users fall for propa-
ganda spread by IRA trolls
US Elections
[5] 3500 Facebook ads ordered by IRA;
tweets of 969 trolls and 1078 ordinary users
Detect: Conduct linguistic analysis to separate the posts
of IRA trolls from native English-speaking users
US Elections; Broad, ex-
ploratory
[6] 899 vaccination-related troll tweets; 1.8M
tweets of ordinary users
Describe: Understand the role of bots and trolls in
vaccination-related discussion
Vaccination debate
[11] 1.8M tweets by 2K trolls; 1.9M tweets by
95K ordinary users
Detect: Define approach of detecting trolls on Twitter
based on textual features
US Elections
[14] 9M tweets by 3.8K trolls;
13.2M tweets by 1.8M ordinary users;
Describe; assess the impact: Define the role and impact
of “politically-motivated actors”, including IRA trolls
Brexit; Broad, ex-
ploratory
[15] Data provided by Facebook, Twitter, and
Google to Senate: posts, ads, accounts
Describe: Analyze trolls’ activity over several social me-
dia platforms
US Elections and other
political events
[16] 347K tweets by 2.2K trolls;
30M tweets by 171K ordinary users
Detect: Develop machine learning models to detect
trolls, apply the models on currently active accounts
Broad, exploratory
[17] 1.7M tweets by 733 trolls Describe: Propose a classification framework to define
the trolls’ identity and social role
US Elections
[20] 3.2M tweets by 2K trolls Describe: Categorize trolls by role in political discussion US Elections
[21] 3485 Brexit-related tweets by 419 trolls Describe: Analyze behavior shifts of trolls over time Brexit
[28] 500M posts by 700 trolls on Live Journal and
80K discussions with trolls’ participation
Assess the impact: Identify the impact of trolls on con-
versations in social media
Political and social
events in Russia
[33] 1.8M images from 9M troll tweets Describe: Characterize image-posting activity of trolls Broad, exploratory
[34] 27K tweets by 1K trolls;
96K tweets by 1K ordinary users
Describe; assess the impact: Characterize trolls’ opera-
tions and their influence on the greater Web
Broad, exploratory
[35] 10M posts by 5.5K Russian (IRA) and Iranian
trolls on Twitter and Reddit
Describe; assess the impact: Identify and compare strate-
gies of different groups of trolls (IRA vs Iranian), analyze
the impact
Broad, exploratory
3.2 The Crash of MH17
Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 en route from Amsterdam to Kuala
Lumpur was shot down in Eastern Ukraine on the 17th of July 2014.
Shortly after the incident, western media accused separatists from
the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) of shooting
down the plane with Buk Missile System. In turn, the separatists
and some Russian media stated that Ukrainian Armed Forces were
to blame [24]. The results of a criminal investigation by the Joint
Investigation Team (JIT) published in September 2016 indicated that
the Buk missile system was transported from Russia to territory
controlled by separatists the day before the incident [26].
The crash of MH17 sparked an intense debate on social media.
In [13], the authors collected tweets related to the incident and
manually marked a sample of English-language tweets based on
the judgements they expressed. 10.3% of tweets appeared to be pro-
Ukrainian, and 5.5% – pro-Russian, while the rest did not take a side.
The authors found that pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian tweets were
mostly spread by accounts identified as ordinary citizens rather
than media figures or politicians. However, they did not consider
the role of trolls in the discussion. Furthermore, no academic studies
have analyzed how trolls reacted to the crash of MH17.
Dutch journalists have analyzed the Twitter-released troll data
and found that the two days after the crash of MH17 were the most
active ever for the trolls in terms of the number of tweets [32].
66000 of the July 18-19 tweets included the hashtags "Kiev Shot
Down Boeing", "Kiev’s Provocation", and "Kiev Tell the Truth". The
authors further found that the first posts after the incident reported
that the militia of DPR brought down a transport plane AN-26,
although no plane other than MH17 was downed on that day.
4 CONTENT ANALYSIS
4.1 Hashtags and Hashtag Campaigns
We first study the hashtags of the troll tweets. About 17% of tweets
include at least one hashtag (vs 47%, p < 0.0013, for English-
language troll tweets); with on average 1.39 hashtags per tweet
with hashtags. Table 2 shows the most used hashtags.
Similar to the previous work for English-language troll tweets
[35], we find that the most common Russian hashtag is #News
(Новости), which accounts for 4.96% of all hashtags used by trolls
(9.47%,p < 0.01, for hashtags used by English language trolls). Other
popular apolitical hashtags include #Auto (Авто), #Sport (Спорт),
and #Cinema (Кино). Furthermore, several top hashtags relate to
3Unless noted otherwise, the statistical tests in the paper are two-sided X 2 proportion
tests from Stata 16.0 with clustered standard errors to account for, for example, multiple
tweets per troll.
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Table 2: Trolls most used hashtags (translated)
Hashtag Share Hashtag Share
News 4.96% ImageOfRussia 1.28%
StPetersburg 4.62% Putin 1.08%
Russia 3.45% Sport 1.04%
RussianSpirit 2.65% ReturnCalifornia 0.98%
NevskieNews 2.18% Cinema 0.94%
KievsProvocation 1.98% BattleOfOligarchs 0.87%
KievShot-
DownBoeing
1.97% Music 0.80%
KievTellTheTruth 1.95% RunZelensky 0.73%
Ukraine 1.85% Politics 0.73%
Auto 1.30% Football 0.72%
geographic locations, such as #StPetersburg4, #Russia (Россия), and
#Ukraine (Украина). Some hashtags have a political sentiment, such
as #KievsProvocation (ПровокацияКиева), whichwas actively used
after the crash of Malaysia Airlines’ flight MH17. Other political
hashtags relate to US (#ReturnCalifornia – ВернитеКалифорнию)
and Ukraine (#PanicInKiev – ПаникаВКиеве). Interestingly, one
of the top hashtags (#RunZelensky – ЗеленскийБеги) refers to
Vladimir Zelensky, then a well-known figure in Russian media
who was later elected as the president of Ukraine. Overall, we
observe more event- and person-specific along with politically
colored hashtags than in the 20 hashtags most used in English-
language operations.
Further, we check whether hashtags can indicate propaganda
campaigns run by Russian trolls. To detect such propaganda hash-
tag campaigns, we first select hashtags used by trolls more than
500 times (303 hashtags) with at least 95% of their occurrences hap-
pened within one month (165 hashtags). Further, we explore tweets
containing the selected hashtags and manually classify them based
on their subject and sentiment. Some of the campaigns included
several hashtags; we remove such duplicates (8 hashtags). Further,
some hashtag campaigns had two subjects and sentiments, for ex-
ample, attacking Ukraine and praising Russia simultaneously. In
such cases, two subjects and sentiments are marked (7 campaigns).
Figure 2 illustrates the focus of the trolls’ hashtag campaigns over
time. Most of the campaigns were run between June 2014 and No-
vember 2015, with only one detected outside this range (in April
2016, not shown in the figure). The analysis shows 163 campaigns
divided into seven categories.
Figure 2 demonstrates that the main focuses of Russian-language
trolls were praising Russia with Putin (48 campaigns), criticiz-
ing Ukraine (43 campaigns), as well as the USA with Obama (15
campaigns). We notice that about half of the Anti-Ukrainian and
Anti-USA and Obama campaigns were run in July-September 2014.
Anti-Ukrainian campaigns further exhibited an increase in January-
February 2015, however, there was a surprising decline in October-
December 2014. Patriotic pro-Russian and pro-Putin campaigns ran
steadily between July 2014 and September 2015, except for Janu-
ary and February 2015. Eight campaigns criticized other countries:
4More precisely, #spb (спб), which stands for Saint Petersburg
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Figure 2: Trolls’ hashtag campaigns by category over time
(+,-,0 indicates the positive, negative, or neutral sentiment
of each campaign category)
three were related to the European Union sanctions targeting Rus-
sia (e.g., #AgainstSanctions – ПротивСанкций), two were against
Canada (e.g., #nocanada in November 2014), two attacked Turkey
and were related to a Russian military jet downed by Turkey in
Syria in November 2015 (e.g., #TurkeyAggressor), and one criti-
cized Armenia for demonstrations in June 2015 (#YerevanBeSmart).
Several campaigns attacked particular Russian and foreign figures
(e.g., #SomeoneWhoKillsChildren against the then president of
Ukraine Petro Poroshenko). Further, about 18% of all hashtag cam-
paigns were apolitical. More than half of such hashtags appeared in
October-December 2014, when anti-Ukraine campaigns were on the
decline. Finally, among the miscellaneous hashtags with varying
subjects and sentiments, three were pro-Ukraine campaigns run in
February 2015 related to the Minsk II agreement5 (e.g., #MinskHope
–МинскаяНадежда); two were anti-LGBT campaigns from July
2015 (e.g., #StopLGBT – СтопЛГБТ), and several campaigns ad-
dressed internal Russian events. For example, in December 2014
trolls blamed speculators for the Russian Ruble depreciation (#Spec-
ulators – Спекулянты).
The hashtag campaign analysis illustrates the wide variation in
topics that the trolls addressed. Interestingly, trolls devoted more
attention to foreign rather than internal Russian affairs. Further-
more, in some campaigns, particularly anti-USA and -Obama, they
addressed events that were not related to Russia. For example, trolls
participated in the #IHaveADream campaign about a black teen
killed by a policeman in the US, and #LatteSalute about Obama
saluting Marines while holding a coffee cup. At the same time,
only six campaigns criticized internal Russian events and figures.
Also, although some of the hashtags were extensively used, only
about 3% of hashtags appeared in the data more than 100 times.
Further, about 45% of hashtags were used only once, as the blue
curve in Figure 3 illustrates, compared with 50% (p < 0.001) for
English-language hashtags. Therefore, although trolls seem to have
been somewhat free in choosing hashtags for their tweets, hashtag
5https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31436513
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Figure 3: ECDF of the counts of hashtag uses, retweets, and
shared URLs per domain
posting by Russian-language trolls was slightly more centralized
than in English-language operations.
4.2 Retweets and Shared URLs
Next, we analyze the use of retweets and URLs in troll tweets.
Around 42.5% of all tweets were retweets (RTs) (vs 44.2%, p > 0.05,
for English-language troll tweets). While around 63.2% contained
a URL (vs 31.5%, p < 0.001, for English-language troll tweets and
26% for ordinary user tweets [34]). Combined, RTs and tweets with
a URL accounted for 75.6% of all troll tweets. The portion of tweets
with a RT or URL varied over time from around 20% in February
2014 to 94% in December 2015. Around 35.9% of the retweets were
the tweets of other trolls. Other retweets included posts of mass
media accounts (with the top three being RIA Novosti, Gazeta.ru,
and RT), public figures, and personal blogs.
Furthermore, we find that the average number of retweets of
a trolls’ tweet (with retweets of other trolls excluded) is 3.1. Only
about 20% of the original troll tweets were retweeted at least once, as
the orange curve in Figure 3 indicates. In addition, among retweeted
tweets, the portion of retweeted tweets shared more than 100 times
is only about 3%. Therefore, engagement with trolls as measured
by the number of retweets is relatively small.
We further analyze retweeting and URL-sharing activity of trolls
through the distribution of tweet types across “active” trolls that
have at least 100 tweets in the data. Figure 4 illustrates the em-
pirical cumulative distribution functions (ECDF) of trolls by tweet
types. The median share of RTs among trolls’ tweets is around 54%,
meaning that RTs account for at least 54% of tweets for half of the
trolls. Furthermore, half of the trolls include a URL in 66% of their
tweets, which is much larger the share of 15% reported for ordinary
users [4]. This observation is consistent with the previous research
[1]. Finally, 50% of trolls included a RT or URL (or both) in 85% of
their tweets, thereby resharing information either directly (RT) or
indirectly (URL).
Furthermore, we analyze the most popular domains referred in
troll tweets. Shortened links accounted for around 40% of all shared
URLs, dominated by the services bit.ly (62% of shortened links),
dlvr.it (11.1%), and goo.gl (9.5%). Therefore, we create a script that
visits each link and captures the final domain after all redirections.
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Figure 4: ECDF of active trolls (≥100 tweets/year) by tweet
types
Table 3: Themost commonweb domains referred to by trolls
Domain Share Domain Share
livejournal.com 20.7% inforeactor.ru 1.5%
riafan.ru 16.8% vk.com 1.5%
gazeta.ru 5.1% tass.ru 1.3%
ria.ru 4.5% politexpert.net 1.3%
rt.com 3.1% emaidan.com.ua 1.1%
nevnov.ru 2.3% lenta.ru 1.0%
vesti.ru 2.1% rbc.ru 1.0%
kievsmi.net 1.8% twitter.com 1.0%
youtube.com 1.7% lifenews.ru 0.9%
kiev-news.com 1.7% podrobnosti.biz 0.8%
However, due to unreachability of some shortened links, we cap-
ture the domain information of around 84% URLs. Table 3 shows
the top 20 most common domains of URLs shared by trolls. More
than one fifth of URLs link to a popular Russian blogging platform
LiveJournal. Other frequently referred domains include the news
agencies FAN (riafan.ru) and Neskiy News (nevnov.ru), which the
US government links to IRA6; sites publishing news about Ukraine
(kievsmi.net, kiev-news.com, and emaidan.com.ua), and social me-
dia platforms (youtube.com, vk.com, and twitter.com). We further
analyze the number of URLs per domain and find that 40% of do-
mains are referred to only once, while 6% of domains are referred
to more than 100 times (as the green curve in Figure 3 indicates).
5 TEMPORAL POSTING PATTERNS
First, we analyze the temporal posting patterns of trolls. For each
troll, we calculate a common temporal burstiness measure B [12] of
their tweets’ inter-arrival times (IATs, the times have a one minute
granularity). The measure is defined as
B =
στ − µτ
στ + µτ
where µτ is the sample mean and στ is the sample standard de-
viation of the IAT distribution τ . B can vary from -1 to 1, with
6https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm577
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Figure 5: ECDF of temporal burstiness of active trolls (≥30
tweets/year) by year
B = 1 corresponding to a highly bursty signal, B = 0 to a random
(Poissonian) signal, and B = −1 to a highly regular (periodic) signal.
We calculate B for each troll that posted at least 30 tweets in a
given year. Figure 5 illustrates the ECDF of B across trolls by year.
We find that at least 95% of trolls exhibited quite periodic posting
patterns with B < 0. The burstiness for ordinary twitter users (and
for many other human driven activities) is around 0.2 to 0.4 [12, 18].
Therefore, we hypothesize that trolls use automation tools for tweet
posting. We further observe that burstiness varied over the years.
Namely, in 2014, posting patterns were the most periodic with a
median B = −0.73, whereas in 2015 and 2016 the median burstiness
increased to −0.38 and −0.36, respectively, potentially indicating a
lower degree of the automation use.
Next, we analyze the periodicity of tweet posting on an aggregate
level. Namely, we examine the frequency distribution for IATs that
were calculated separately for each troll and pooled together. We
construct the frequency distribution for every year from 2014 to
2017. The distributions in Figure 6 show cyclical patterns in tweet
posting activity. We observe that posting patterns also differ across
years. Namely, in 2014, peaks of IATs were generally multiples of
three, particularly, after IAT = 90. In 2015, peaks of IATs were spread
around multiples of 20, generally in the interval [20n − 2, 20n + 1].
In 2016-2017, patterns were similar, with IAT peaks at multiples
of 30 minutes as well as at 10, 15, 20, and 48 minutes. However, in
2017 the hourly peaks were more prominent than in 2016.
Overall, the periodic temporal patterns in Figure 6 reinforce
the automation findings from Figure 5. Furthermore, given that
the analysis was conducted on an aggregate level, we infer that
some trolls used automation tools with the same or similar settings.
For example, in 2015, about 47% of trolls had more IATs between
[20n − 2, 20n + 1] (multiples of 20 min) than the 20% of trolls that
we would expect given uniformly random automation settings.
Though we also note that the share of such automated tweets rarely
exceeded 50% for any troll suggesting trolls also likely manually
posted or changed automation settings.
6 REACTING TO MH17 CRASH
Furthermore, we analyze the reaction of trolls to the crash of
Malaysia Airlines flight MH17.
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Figure 6: Frequency distribution for the inter-arrival times
of troll tweets by year
Trolls used hashtags #KievsProvocation (ПровокацияКиева),
#KievShotDownBoeing (КиевСбилБоинг), and #KievTellTheTruth
(КиевСкажиПравду) during the two days after the incident. We
find troll tweets related to the incident using the above-defined hash-
tags and the keywords "mh17", "boeing" with Russian and English
spellings, as well as Russian equivalents of the words "shot down"
(сбил*, сбит*), "buk*" (бук*), "crash*" (катастроф*), "Malaysia*"
(малази*, малайз*), and "plane" (самолет*). Furthermore, we only
select tweets posted from 17.07.2014 14:00 (approximate time of
the plane crash) until the end of July 2014. This results in 71023
tweets, 92.4% of which were posted with at least one of the three
mentioned hashtags, making the operation one of the largest run
by the Russian trolls. This observation is in line with [32]. The
content of tweets was often exactly the same for each of the three
campaign hashtags. Nevertheless, perhaps due to space restrictions,
most troll tweets used only one of the hashtags. Figure 7 shows
the number of troll tweets related to the crash of MH17 published
between 14:00 17.07 and 14:00 20.07, as 99% of the such tweets fall
into this interval. The hashtag campaigns started at around 9:00
on 18.07 and ended abruptly at around 12:00 on 19.07. The mean
tweet rate during the campaign was 2484 tweets per hour, 9.4 times
higher than the mean for July 2014. The mean hourly number of
active trolls during the MH17 campaign was around 288, compared
to 98 over all of July 2014.
6.1 First reactions
Table 4 shows the tweets that trolls posted during the first several
hours after the crash including the tweet time (UTC) and the num-
ber of similar tweets posted within 10 minutes of each first tweet.
This can show whether tweet posting was coordinated.
The very first tweet related to the crash was posted at 15:01
stating that the militia of DPR had shot down a Ukrainian transport
plane (an AN-26). The tweet referred to a news article published
by the Federal News Agency7. The link to the article is still active,
although the article has no connection to the original title indicated
in the URL. At 15:40, the first tweets informing about the crash
of MH17 appeared. At 15:59, the first tweet that blamed Ukraine
7http://riafan.ru/2014/07/17/29576-opolchentsyi-dnr-sbili-transportnyiy-an-26-pod-
gorodom-snezhnoe/
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Figure 7: Number of hourly troll tweets related toMH17 over
time
for the incident was posted. Surprisingly, starting from 16:14, ten
tweets appeared that repeated the statement that the DPR had shot
down a Ukrainian transport plane but included the hashtag #mh17.
Moreover, one of the trolls first posted a tweet about the crash of
MH17, and later about the shot-down transport plane.
Finally, at 16:21 and 16:41 the authorities of DPR first denied
their involvement and then blamed Ukrainian armed forces. At
16:45, a single tweet was posted stating that a plane was shot down
by Russia with a link to a suspended blog post. At 17:19, some
trolls posted tweets saying the DPR was framed by Ukrainian air
controllers who had sent the plane into the firing zone. Finally,
at 17:21 trolls stated, with the reference to the Luhansk People’s
Republic (LPR), that MH17 was shot down by a Ukrainian attack
plane that was later destroyed.
The analysis of first reactions shows that at first trolls relied on
the information from separatists that initially reported on downing
of military AN-26 plane. Even after the crash of MH17 had been
confirmed, some trolls did not seem to have realized that these
two messages referred to the same incident. After the situation
was clarified, trolls started to spread inconsistent messages placing
responsibility on Ukraine, separatists, and even Russia. Therefore,
it seems that in an initial fog of war scenario, the trolls were more
interested in spreading confusion and mistrust rather than waiting
to develop a coherent narrative and strategy. This method allows
them to move quickly (within minutes of the incident) and in a
decentralized manner.
6.2 Tweet text analysis
We observe that many tweets from different trolls include exactly
the same text (while not being retweets). To test this, we tokenize
tweets into sentences. We find 94 tokens that were used more
than 500 times, with the most common being “why shoot down
a civilian plane” (зачем сбивать гражданский самолет), “what
did you expect” (а вы чего ждали), “do you agree with me” (а
вы со мной согласны), and “here is what my friend posted” (вот
друг мой опубликовал). Many tweets combined two or three
of such sentences, e.g., "There are as many opinions as there are
people. Why shoot down a civilian plane? Ukrops went totally nuts".
Table 4: First reactions of trolls to MH17 crash and number
of similar tweets within 10 mins
Time Tweet text (translated) Tweets in
10 min
15:01 The militia of DPR shot down a transport
AN-26 near the town of Snizhne URL
14
15:40 Malaysian plane Amsterdam – Kuala
Lumpur crashed on the border of Ukraine
and Russia URL
19
15:59 Daily Bacchanalia in Ukraine. Today a
plane was accidentally shot down. It’s ter-
rible, comrades, how can one live like that?
1
16:14 The militia reports: another plane of
Ukrainian air forces was destroyed #mh17
ukraine-russia
10
16:21 DPR denies the involvement in the crash
of Malaysian plane URL
10
16:41 The authorities of DPR blamed Ukrainian
armed forces for the crash of Malaysian
Boeing URL
19
16:45 A plane was shot down by Russia URL 1
17:19 RT: #Ukraine frames (makes) #DPR shoot
down an international plane by sending it
through air controllers to the firing zone
URL
3
17:21 Boeingwas shot down byUkrainian attack
plane, which was later destroyed - LPR
(Luhansk People’s Republic) URL
18
Interestingly, some of these common sentences were also used in
other anti-Ukrainian and anti-USA hashtag campaigns later on,
such as #ReturnCalifornia (ВернитеКалифорнию) in September
2014 and #BattleOfOligarchs (БитваОлигархов) in March 2015.
Further, we analyze the text of trolls’ tweets related to the MH17
incident to understand their purpose andmain message. Specifically
we use a two-stage approach. In the first stage, we cluster tweets
using a machine learning approach. In the second stage, we hand-
code tweet clusters into six categories using an inductive content
analysis approach [8].
6.2.1 Clustering stage. Tweets are first lemmatized using the Yan-
dex MyStem 3.1 morphological analyzer8. Then stopwords and
punctuation are removed. Apart from the common stopwords, we
also remove the three most common hashtags discussed above. Fur-
ther, tweets are tokenized into words, and small tweets with less
than 7 tokens as well as tokens that occurred only once are filtered
out. The remaining 41143 tweets contain 1401 unique tokens.
We calculate the term frequency-inverse document frequency
(TF-IDF) for the corpus of tweets and the pairwise cosine similari-
ties between the TF-IDF of tweets. We also test embedding-based
representations of tweets, but TF-IDF performs well in grouping
very similar (almost duplicate) tweets, and therefore we select it
8https://yandex.ru/dev/mystem/; https://github.com/nlpub/pymystem3
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as a more intuitive approach. Next we cluster tweets using ag-
glomerative hierarchical clustering. Average linkage is selected as
it produces the most persuasive clusters. We test several cluster
cut-off levels from 0.3 to 0.7 in increments of 0.05 and compare
the resulting clusters using the silhouette coefficient. Lower cut-off
levels result in a higher silhouette score but also larger numbers of
clusters, particularly singletons. Therefore, we choose the cut-off
level of 0.5 as a trade-off resulting in a reasonably small number of
clusters for hand-coding (n = 873, including 200 singletons) and an
acceptable silhouette coefficient (0.44)9.
6.2.2 Coding stage. The clusters are coded by the main author
based on the text of five randomly selected tweets from each clus-
ter. For clusters with less than 5 tweets, all available tweets are
inspected. The coding scheme is developed iteratively to represent
the main purpose and message of tweet clusters. To ensure the
reliability of coding, 15% of clusters (n=131) are also independently
coded by another researcher with native Russian language skills.
Cohen’s kappa score of inter-rater reliability on the sample varies
from 0.79 to 0.92 for different coding categories, indicating at least
a substantial level of agreement [19].
For coding, first the tweet text (excluding hashtags) is examined
to determine if the text actually mentions or implies the MH17
incident. If so, the tweet is also coded through the scheme described
below. These directly related tweets are referred to as DR tweets.
This initial filtering helps to remove hashtag-amplifying tweets
with unrelated text.
The coding scheme for the DR tweets consists of the following
non-exclusive categories:
(1) Tweets blame Ukraine for theMH17 incident.The tweets blame
Ukraine either directly or indirectly for downing the plane
or enabling the incident.
(2) Tweets include the following narrative of blame on Ukraine.
For tweets in category (1), the narrative of blame is also
grouped into several categories such as Ukrainians downed
the plane or Ukrainians are responsible at least indirectly
(e.g. for letting the incident happen).
(3) Tweets contain news. The tweets include information related
to the incident that is presented as news rather than personal
opinion and refers to a source (such as photos or reports of
eyewitness) or is based on expert opinions.
(4) Tweets contain disinformation or propaganda. For tweets in
category (3), the tweets contains disinformation (i.e., contra-
dicts the findings of JIT) or presents information in a biased
way to support a particular narrative10 (propaganda news).
(5) Tweets contain the following narrative of disinformation and
propaganda. For tweets in category (4), the narrative of dis-
information and propaganda is grouped into four high-level
and 16 low-level categories as shown in Table 6.
6.2.3 Findings. We find that 68% of the troll tweets (when hashtags
are excluded) do not actually mention or imply the incident (i.e.,
non-DR tweets). Therefore, these tweets seemingly served only as
9At a cut-off level of 0.4, the silhouette score is only 7% higher (0.47), yet the number
of clusters is 115% higher (1883).
10News containing erroneous information, which does not suggest a responsible party
or an alternative version of the incident, is not considered as disinformation.
Table 5: The narratives of blame placed on Ukraine for the
crash of MH17 of troll tweets
Narrative Example tweet Share
Ukraine downed
the plane
News of Ukraine. According to
an expert, the Boeing 777 was
shot down by Ukrainian air de-
fense with 90% probability
73%
Ukraine is respon-
sible at least indi-
rectly
Vladimir Putin: Ukraine is re-
sponsible for the Boeing crash
21%
Ukraine interferes
with the investiga-
tion
Latest news: Ukraine does not
allow Malaysian experts to the
Boeing wreckage
3%
Ukraine may be
responsible
Just read it. Experts recall Tu-
155 shot down 13 years ago
3%
hashtag-amplifiers. Furthermore, 99.9% of such tweets were pub-
lished during the hashtag campaign (between 9:00 18.07 and 12:00
19.07) compared to 89.9% for DR tweets, supporting the hypothesis
of hashtag amplification. Nevertheless, almost all of such non-DR
tweets discuss Ukraine in a more general context, typically in a
negative tone.
Surprisingly, tweets blaming Ukraine for the incident account
for only 49% of the DR tweets. Nevertheless, this share is much
larger than 5.5% of pro-Russian tweets detected by [13] for English-
language tweets related to MH17. Table 5 shows the distribution
for the narratives of blame among such tweets. About 73% of such
tweets suggest that Ukraine downed the plane and 21% say that
Ukraine is responsible at least indirectly (e.g., by allowing the plane
to fly over the war zone or by escalating the conflict in Ukraine).
Further, 3% blame Ukraine for interfering with the crash investiga-
tion, mainly by bombing the crash site. Finally, around 3% point to
the potential responsibility of Ukraine without directly blaming,
e.g., by recalling a similar incident with a Russian Tu-155 acciden-
tally shot down by the Ukrainian Air Force in 2001 or stating that
at the time of the crash MH17 was in a Ukrainian air-defense zone.
Furthermore, about 57% of the DR tweets contain news. Most of
the news tweets inform about the number of crash victims, their
nationality, the progress of evidence collection, or report the state-
ments of officials on the incident. However, 23% of news tweets
(13% of all DR tweets) contain disinformation or propaganda. Ta-
ble 6 shows the main narratives of such tweets. About half of the
disinformation suggests that a Ukrainian fighter aircraft downed
the plane. According to trolls, the size of debris indicated that the
plane was downed by an air-to-air missile. Trolls further referred
to a statement from Spanish air-traffic controller’s working in Kiev,
which claimed to have seen a military aircraft escorting MH1711.
About 23.1% of disinformation tweets suggest that Ukraine downed
the plane from the ground, with 11.8% not openly blaming but
stating that Ukraine relocated their Buk missile systems to the loca-
tion of the missile launch a day before the crash. Interestingly, two
contradicting disinformation campaigns (Ukrainians shot down
11This statement was later disproven as Ukrainian laws require air traffic controllers
to have Ukrainian citizenship
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Table 6: The narratives of disinformation and propaganda
of troll tweets
Narrative Share
Ukrainian fighter aircraft downed the plane: 49.8%
- Debris are too large 24.2%
- Statement of air controller 10.2%
- Eyewitness report 10.1%
- Using machine guns 2.1%
- Other 3.2%
Ukrainians downed the plane from the ground: 23.1%
- Ukrainians relocated Buks shortly before the
incident
11.8%
- Assassination attempt on Putin 7.1%
- Using air defense systems (general) 2.9%
- Mistake at military training 1.3%
Other narratives (blaming Ukraine): 21.4%
- Ukraine interferes with the investigation 7.4%
- President of Ukraine knew about the incident
before it happened
7.1%
- Traffic controllers purposefully diverted the
plane to the war zone
1.7%
- Miscellaneous 5.2%
Other narratives (not blaming Ukraine): 5.6%
- Separatists shot down AN-26 1.3%
- Conspiracy theories 0.5%
- Miscellaneous 3.8%
the plane by an air-to-air vs. ground-to-air missile) were run in
parallel. Overall, trolls’ tweets seem to reflect the changing and
contradicting narratives of the Russian government on MH17 [29].
Furthermore, 21.4% of disinformation and propaganda tweets
use other narratives to blame Ukraine. Trolls suggested that the
incident was a planned operation, and that the President of Ukraine
knew about the crash before it happened because his reaction to
the crash was so fast. Finally, about 5.6% of disinformation tweets
do not blame Ukraine, including a few posts where trolls confused
MH17 for a military AN-26 (see Table 4) and a few tweets with
experts supporting conspiracy theories.
7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper shed light on domestic and regional Russian-language
operations of Russian trolls on Twitter by analyzing trolls’ tweets
from between 2014 and 2017. Namely, we first studied the tweets’
content through their hashtags, the use of retweets, and shared
URLs. Further, we analyzed tweets’ temporal posting patterns. After
that, we focused on trolls’ reaction to Malaysia Airlines MH17 crash.
Tweet Content. Comparing the results of the hashtag analysis
with English-language hashtags of Russian trolls from a previous
study [35], we see that in both cases trolls did not focus solely on
political and social issues, but also used apolitical hashtags (e.g.,
#Sport) likely to appear similar to ordinary users. Nevertheless,
at least eight out of the top 20 hashtags in Russian were related
to politics, compared with three for English-language operations
[35]. This difference is mainly due to the “hashtag campaigns” that
Russian-language trolls often ran, which accounted for six of the
eight political hashtags, and which did not seem to be common in
English-language operations. A potential motivation for such cam-
paigns is to increase the hashtag visibility in the country-specific
Twitter trends. Therefore, a hashtag campaign is more sensible in
the smaller Russian domain of Twitter rather than a larger English
language domain.
We discovered 165 hashtag campaigns, which were run between
June 2014 and November 2015. Their main sentiments were attack-
ing Ukraine, USA and Obama personally, as well as praising Russia
and Putin. The targets of such campaigns stayed roughly the same
over the 18 months. However, about half of anti-Ukraine and anti-
USA campaigns were run between July-September 2014, when the
international pressure on Russia increased following the crash of
MH17. Further, no campaigns praising Russia and Putin appeared
in January-February 2015. This could be related to the depreciation
of Russian ruble that peaked during these months. Moreover, there
was also no anti-USA campaigns during the months.
We further found that trolls actively reshared information by
using retweets (RTs) and URLs. The share of original tweets (i.e.,
without RTs or URLs) was only about 24%, and only about a quarter
of trolls posted original tweets more often than tweets with RTs or
URLs. About two thirds of trolls’ retweets were the posts of non-
troll accounts. Though at least half of the top 20 most retweeted
non-troll accounts and most referenced internet domains were
of mainstream media. However, an average troll tweet received
only about 3.1 retweets from ordinary users, showing that the
engagement with trolls’ posts was relatively low.
Temporal posting patterns.We analyzed the burstiness and
frequency distribution of tweet inter-arrival times (IATs) to un-
derstand their temporal posting patterns. Using burstiness we dis-
covered that, unlike normal Twitter users, many trolls exhibited
highly periodic posting patterns. Furthermore, the frequency distri-
bution of pooled IATs revealed three distinct cyclical patterns that
prevailed during different years. Namely, in 2014, peaks in IATs
were detected at multiples of three minutes, in 2015, multiples of
20 minutes, and in 2016-2017, multiples of 30 minutes. Such pat-
terns could indicate the use of tweet posting automation tools with
similar settings. Therefore, Russian trolls could more accurately be
described as cyborgs or bot-assisted humans [7].
Reacting to MH17 crash. In reaction to the crash of Malaysia
Airlines flightMH17, Russian-language trolls ran their largest single
information campaign (by the number of tweets). However, 68%
of the 71K tweets of the campaign had text not directly related to
the incident; such tweets were seemingly used only for hashtag
amplification. Nearly half of the remaining (related) tweets blamed
Ukraine for the crash, either alleging that Ukraine downed the
plane (73%), or suggesting some degree of responsibility (21%).
Surprisingly, only 13% of such related tweets contained news-like
disinformation or propaganda. Furthermore, the narratives of such
fake news were not internally consistent. Namely, approximately
half stated that Ukraine shot down the plane with an air-to-air
missile, whereas about 23% suggested the use of a ground-to-air
missile. The fake news also reported diverse reasons for the incident,
ranging from framing the separatists and Russia, to a mistake in
military training, to a failed assassination attempt on Putin.
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